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Configuration Management and Security
Steven M. Bellovin and Randy Bush
Abstract—Proper configuration management is vital for host
and network security. We outline the problems, especially for
large-scale environments, and discuss the security aspects of a
number of different configuration scenarios, including security
appliances (e.g., firewalls), desktop and server computers, and
PDAs. We conclude by discussing research challenges.
Index Terms—Configuration management, security, database,
compilation, Internet network devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
COMPUTER systems require configuration. This is obvi-ous to anyone who has used even the simplest consumer-
grade machines, which demand that you supply your name and
the computer’s name when they are first unpacked. Anyone
who has worked with system or network administrators knows
that full configuration is far more complex, including the
ability — and sometimes the need — to set options that most
people don’t even know exist.
What is less obvious, even to many system administrators,
is that configuration management is a vital part of system
and site security. Not only do security devices themselves
require configuration, many rather ordinary aspects of life with
computers (e.g., the fact that laptops are sometimes turned
off and hence can’t be reconfigured) have implications for
security.
Security configuration has another unique feature: it has
strong interactions with business and personnel policy. Many
security decisions are concrete instantiations of management
decisions. Incorrect configuration can endanger business rela-
tionships or have legal ramifications.
Conversely, by definition security involves dealing with
enemies. That is, someone will try to counter your moves.
Managing security configuration is not simply a matter of
designing the right configuration and distributing it, con-
tending only with Murphy’s Law; instead, the administrator
must contend with active attempts to subvert configurations,
evade them, or drive the system into an improbable state not
anticipated by the configuration. Note well that “enemies” can
include a site’s own employees.
This, then, is the challenge of security configuration man-
agement: to devise and deploy policies that carry out orga-
nizational requirements — including, of course the ability to
get work done1 — despite lack of cooperation from many
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insiders, and active opposition both from outsiders and from
honest-but-frustrated insiders.
A. Paper Structure
We start by examining the security implications of config-
uration management at scale. Large-scale systems are always
different; this section examines how this is true for security
configuration.
The heart of the paper explores security configuration
management for five different scenarios: security appliances,
network infrastructure, ordinary user computers, servers, and
PDAs. Each of these pose different configuration management
challenges, and of course any of these problems are worse for
large-scale sites.
We follow with a real-world case study, examining how a
major ISP used a database-driving configuration scheme, for
both security and correctness reasons.
We conclude with a few parting thoughts, including sug-
gestions for future research directions.
II. CHALLENGES OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS
A. The Problem of Scale
Often, a difference in scale is qualitative, not simply quan-
titative. Managing the configuration of 100 machines is a
different problem than managing one or two; managing 1000
is different still.
It’s tempting to say that that isn’t true, that each individual
machine owner can manage its configuration. That is, we are
not dealing with 1000 machines as a group, we instead have
1000 problems we already know how to solve. There are at
least four problems with this approach.
The first is that individually-administered machines are
often poorly administered. Most computer users are not pro-
fessional system administrators. Just as many home machines
are misconfigured, from a security perspective and an ordinary
correctness perspective, doing the same in a corporate envi-
ronment will result in very many misconfigured machines.
The second problem is consistency. In many environments,
enterprise configurations are centrally specified. Leaving the
configuration up to individuals will inevitably result in miscon-
figurations, ranging from choice of software — did everyone
install the mandatory corporate applications? Will they be
updated? — to certain security settings that the machine users
may be unaware of or even resent. To give just one example,
many companies disable USB mass storage devices, to make
it harder for someone to exfiltrate sensitive corporate data.
Together, these raise a third problem: interactions. That is,
two configurations that by themselves are correct can interact
in dangerous ways. Martin et al. give an example where
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correct Java behavior and correct firewall behavior for the FTP
protocol [1] combine to produce a security hole [2].
Finally — and this point is often ignored by those not in
the system administration business — many machines (and in
some environments, most machines) are not ordinary desktop
PCs. Servers, virtual machines, and even many embedded
systems require configuration management, too. Network-
connected printers can be hacked as easily — and in some
cases more easily — than ordinary desktop PCs, and may in
fact run some of the same software.
Some form of centralized configuration management is
necessary, then, both for correct operation and security. While
there are many ways to accomplish this, a number of require-
ments must be satisfied:
Security The configuration management scheme must be
secure, in many senses of the word. Its databases must
be protected against unuathorized access or modification,
the communications with the managed hosts must be
authenticated, integrity-protected, and often encrypted;
the commands to the managment system must be properly
authenticated.
Database-Driven Different machines have different roles;
as such, they require different configurations. A desktop
machine may have no need for a web server; depending
on the user’s needs, though, it may need a database server.
Other machines — say, mail servers — may need neither,
but may need other specialized software.
Robustness There will be configuration failures. Machines
may be down during attempted updates; other, unman-
aged changes may have occurred; changes — specifically
including vendor-supplied patches — may fail to install. If
the configuration changes are security-relevant, this could
have serious consequences.
B. It’s Turtles All the Way Down
It is clear from the above description that managing the
configuration of a large number of machines requires effort:
people, software, and data. What is less obvious is that config-
uration management systems themselves require management,
and perhaps their own layer of management systems.
For one thing, in a large-enough enterprise a single con-
figuration management system is insufficient. Not only can
it not handle the load, a secondary machine is needed for
redundancy.
In a geographically distributed environment, database main-
tenance at least must be geographically distributed. Every
new computer’s configuration needs must be entered into
the database; this is hard to do when the administrators are
unaware of the very existence of the machine, let alone its
role and needs. For that matter, in many environments it
is necessary to conduct audits, manual and electronic, to
detect new machines and enroll them appropriately in the
configuration management system.
Finally, configuration needs change. New software is ob-
tained, new applications are developed, etc. Who, 10 years
ago, would have anticipated the need to configure desktop
machines with the identity of the corporate IM server? To-
day, forward-looking IT managers are planning for corporate
SecondLife R© proxies.
III. SCENARIOS
Different configuration scenarios have different needs. It is
instructive to examine them in detail. Note that these needs
exist regardless of the existence of configuration management
systems; however, as will become clear, some of the problems
described are much more serious in large-scale environments.
A. Security Appliances
The most obvious class of computers with security-
sensitive configurations is security appliances: firewalls, fil-
tering routers, etc. Such devices not only provide security for
the rest of the enterprise, they have stringent security needs
of their own.
The hardest problem in this environment is independent
of the mechanics of the configuration. Rather, it is what the
configuration should be. It in turn depends on the network
topology and the desired security policy. Neither is obvious;
both change. Security policies, for example, change in re-
sponse to new software, new business needs, and new threats.
A joint venture with some other company will frequently
change both: dedicated links may be set up, and firewall rules
must be adjusted to permit access to some but not all resources.
(The alternative to a new, dedicated link is a virtual private
network connection. These are generally cheaper but carry
their own set of security-sensitive configuration needs.)
Complex firewall configurations are known to be error-
prone [3]. This is likely to remain true even if fully distributed
firewalls are used [4]; those solve the topology problem but
not the policy issue.
Given a proposed firewall policy, it is important to verify
it. While automated tools (see, for example, [5], [6]) can
detect certain classes of errors, such tools cannot differentiate
between a policy that is plausible and a policy that reflects the
actual desire. That is, there is no a priori difference between
allowing port 80 access to the official corporate web server
and allowing port 80 access to a sensitive internal web server;
an automated algorithm cannot distinguish between the two
cases. Verifying topology changes is even harder [7].
Ultimately, both problems are more complex in geograph-
ically dispersed organizations. It is hard for a central system
administrator to know which servers should be accessible to
which outside parties, let alone when new links have been
installed to some far-off location.
Security appliances themselves need security protection [8].
Maintaining such configurations is itself a difficult problem.
Indeed, one recent survey [9] reported that ISPs called man-
agement of access control lists (ACLs) their “most critical”
problem. Recent work on automatic generation of ACLs [10]
may help.
B. Infrastructure
Even ordinary infrastructure nodes (i.e., those with no
special security role) have security-sensitive configurations.
If nothing else, an adversary who controls these elements
can disrupt connectivity throughout the organization. A more
sophisticated attacker can reroute traffic through an eavesdrop-
ping node. Correct configuration — that is, correct passwords,
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correct access control lists, suitable logging, etc., can go a long
way towards preventing such attacks.
Logging functions on switches are important when tracing
certain kinds of attacks. In particular, logging MAC addresses
and traffic volumes can help isolate the source of denial of
service attacks and address spoofing attacks (see [11], [12]).
Again, this is configuration that must be managed.
Even without malicious attacks, maintaining router config-
urations is difficult. When something goes wrong with routing
— and that is not at all improbable, in complex configurations
— technicians who repair the problem will often forget to up-
date the master configuration database. To this end, some sites
periodically poll routers for their configurations, comparing
them to the officially-authorized versions [13]. In effect, this
acts like a Tripwire system ( [14], [15], [16]) for routers.
The harder problem, though, is conflicting security policies.
The issue isn’t so much technical (i.e., see [17] or [18])
as it is political: whose policy should dominate? That is,
given a disagreement between overall corporate policies and
local needs, which should control? Technical mechanisms can
identify the problem but not solve it. We note here that the
decisions made can affect both the security of the corporate
network and the productivity of local business units.
C. Desktops and Laptops
Desktop and laptop computers present a more familiar
security configuration challenge. The administrator must en-
sure that proper programs, patches, and anti-virus update are
installed. However, many of the issues we have seen before
occur in this space as well, including policy conflicts. The
dimensions of the problem differ, however.
The first issue is that there is a new player: the authorized
user of the machine. Rightly or wrongly, individuals with
personal computers regard them as personal machines, and
frequently use them for unofficial purposes. Frequently, this
includes ignoring official policies [19]. Such misbehavior can
extend to the very highest ranks [20]. Mechanisms for ensuring
desktop and laptop configurations must account for employee
non-cooperation and even willful misbehavior.
A second issue is that the timing of patch application must
be controlled. Patches — even security patches — are often
incompatible with essential applications. Proper configuration,
then, must be capable of either preventing normal vendor
patches from being installed (see, for example, the Microsoft
tool that allowed corporations to delay installing Service
Pack 2 to Windows XP [21]) or forcing installation if there is
an exigent security threat [22].
Beyond that, laptops and corporate-owned home desktop
machines are often inaccessible. Hotel and home firewalls
and Network Address Translator (NAT) boxes almost always
prevent connections into such machines; in many cases, they
block outbound connections to the corporate configuration
server. (We note with amusement that such a server must
frequently be located outside the corporate firewall, to permit
upgrades by machines too insecure to be allowed within the
firewall.)
D. Servers
Servers, on the other hand, are much simpler in many ways.
The owner is rarely the adversary, they are generally quite
accessible, etc. Patch timing must still be controlled; addi-
tionally, they suffer from a different problem: heterogeneity.
Desktop machines within an organization tend to be quite
similar. Most people need most of the same applications;
unused applications that do not contain privileged programs or
network listeners are rarely a major problem. Servers, on the
other hand, differ widely. Web server machines need a web
server daemon, of course; depending on the nature of the web
pages being served, they may also need databases, Perl or PHP
interpreters, Wikis, etc. Secure configuration of any of these
is tricky; a configuration management system (or person) for
servers must be able to handle any and all of these. That is,
it must first know which components apply to which servers;
second, it must know how to combine the necessary security
configuration aspects with the server-specific parameters. For
example, a web server must be configured with things like a
document root directory, policies regarding execution of CGI
or ASP scripts, keys and certificates, access control policies,
etc. Almost always, these will be different on different servers,
but they are all quite critical for security.
E. PDAs and Phones
The newest configuration challenge for organizations is the
PDA or “smartphone”. These devices are often personally
owned, but used for business purposes, such as checking email.
Some, such as Apple’s iPhone, were not initially designed with
corporate needs in mind [23]:
Many IT groups have banned the iPhone from their
workplaces, complaining that there is no way to
force employees to protect their iPhones with pass-
words and that they can’t erase sensitive corporate
data from remote locations if the device is stolen
or lost. Additionally, they say the iPhone doesn’t
support the software many businesses use and that
it only works on one cellular carrier’s network.
It is not clear yet just how the configuration of such devices
will be managed. It is clear that as they gain access to
corporate networks, such management will be necessary.
IV. A REAL-WORLD CASE STUDY
A few large ISPs recognized many of these issues long
ago and built their operations support systems accordingly
(Figure 1). Their systems rested on three major principles:
databases, compilation, and monitoring.
A. Databases
The first principle, as suggested earlier, is that all con-
figuration should be database-driven. All relevant informa-
tion, whether it is the physical hardware in any location or
administratively-assigned parameters such as the IP addresses
assigned to a given customer, are recorded in a database.
All changes must be recorded in the database; if the actual,
physical configuration differs, then by definition it is wrong,
not the database. The contrasting — and all too common —
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Fig. 1. Overall data flow for a database-driven configuration system.
alternative, the notion that “the network is the database of
record”, was explicitly rejected.
This approach has many advantages. Perhaps the most
important is correctness. For one thing, the database represents
an engineered approach to design: physical circuits that were
selected to meet some higher-level goal, such as path diversity,
will be used as intended. Additionally, various data items need
only be entered once; there is no chance of inconsistency if
two or more copies of some item disagree.
Another important advantage was long-term cost savings.
While it certainly costs something to build, operate, and
administer this infrastructure, it saves on operational expenses:
hand-built configurations are time-consuming and error-laden;
correcting such errors is itself an expensive proposition.
An important security advantage is responsiveness: if a se-
curity incident is occurring, new configurations can be pushed
out to all nodes very quickly. For example, the Slammer worm
was stopped when many ISPs blocked UDP port 1434 via
access control lists on their routers. Distributing such ACLs,
in a system like this, is simply a matter of changing the
standard inbound packet ACL in one place and initiating the
distribution. Even new firmware images can be sent out as
needed.
The databases (Figure 2) contain
• device descriptions for routers etc. with models, versions,
etc.
• interface descriptions
• circuit descriptions and bindings to interfaces
• IP address allocations bindings to interfaces and cus-
tomers
• BGP peering relationships to customers and peers
• DNS delegations to customers
The data are generated and maintained by many units of
the organization, from circuit management, asset management
(routers), routing engineers, IP allocation engineers, etc.
B. Compilation
The compilation process is similar to that for ordinary
programming languages; however, the programs themselves
are very different. In this environment, there is a separate
“main program” called a device list for each device type, such
Fig. 2. Generating configuration.
as a router or switch. In addition, because different models
of device from different vendors must be supported, there
are configuration templates for devices (e.g. a Juniper M5
configuration skeleton). There are also templates for snippets
of specific configuration details such as BGP peerings, Packet
over SONET (POS) interfaces, etc. The device lists drive the
generation process; it in turn finds the BGP peerings, interface
details, etc. in the databases, and uses those data to drive the
appropriate snippet templates to generate the configurations.
A sample code segment containing a template is shown
in Figure 3. Note that, due to proprietary issues (network
configuration is seen as a non-trivial competitive advantage),
this is not from a major ISP but from the private code of one
of the authors’ small research networks. Hence the database
and code are degenerate examples of a large scale system.
Note the configuration generation loops over all peers in the
peer table in Figure 4. (Loops and conditionals at compile-
time are not, of course, new; IBM’s PL/1 compiler and Basic
Assembly Language for the Systems/360, among others, had
such things more than 40 years ago.) When run against the
database shown in Figure 4, it produces output beginning:
neighbor 191.42.180.10 {
peer-as 6666;















import [ no-bogons dampening peer-1423 ];
}
as well as massively long access control lists (ACLs) used to
filter prefixes allowed from each peer.
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printf (POLICY "policy-statement peer-%d {\n", $AS );
printf (POLICY " term ok {\n");
printf (POLICY " from {\n");
foreach $PREFIX (@PFX) {
printf (POLICY " route-filter $PREFIX exact;\n");
}
printf (POLICY " }\n");
printf (POLICY " then accept;\n");
printf (POLICY " }\n");
printf (POLICY " term final {\n");
printf (POLICY " then reject\n");
printf (POLICY " }\n");
printf (POLICY " }\n");
printf (PEERS " neighbor %s {\n", $IP);
printf (PEERS " peer-as $AS;\n");
if ( $MD5 ne "NONE" ) {
printf (PEERS " authentication-key \"%s\";\n", $MD5);
}
printf (PEERS " import [ no-bogons dampening peer-%d ];\n",
$AS);
printf (PEERS " }\n");
Fig. 3. A code template segment for a Juniper router. This one is actually a Perl script invoked by the compiler.
In addition to provider-specific databases, public databases,
such as the Internet Routing Registry (see http://www.irr.net/),
are used as a source of information about network topology
and prefix allocation to create routing filter ACLs. Because
this is too complex to do manually, those providers who
do not automate do not do proper filtering. This leads to
incidents such as the YouTube/Pakistani accident, where a
singe provider’s mistake caused routing trouble for much of
the Internet.
Many devices have operational idiosyncrasies that must be
accomodated. For example, some devices reset some or all
subsystems when asked to fully reload a configuration; e.g.,
many Cisco routers reset BGP sessions even though nothing
about BGP has changed). Consequently, the generation system
usually makes a “diff” file with only the changes that need to
be pushed to the device.
As the push to the device could have surprising or even
unhappy results, it is customary to first email changes to
a human a few hours in advance of changing the device
configurations. This allows for last-minute corrections. This
process is usually done on daily basis, but the periodicity and
timing varies between providers and across geography and
topology. A large provider will tend to roll changes out slowly
across their network, often over a number of hours.
Occasionally, an emergency fix has to be pushed to one or
more devices. To that end, the system has controls to cause
an immediate rebuild and push. The engineer changes the
database entries to represent the changes desired, presses the
button to generate the new configuration, hopefully checks it
for errors, and then tells the system to push it to the device.
Although we do not know of any ISPs who actually do this,
using a compilation-based approach makes it easy to use more
sophisticated mechanisms to verify and build a configuration.
Narain et al. [24] describe use of a requirement solver to
build configurations. Another possibility is construction of
optimizing compilers. For example, the scheme described
in [10] could be adopted. It would be very interesting to
MD5
ASN IP Address IRR AS-MACRO Key
6666 191.42.180.10 CW AS666 NONE
1234 191.42.180.12 VERIO AS-BIGONE fnardle
1243 191.42.180.13 RADB AS-CATS fnoofle
1423 191.42.180.22 EPOCH AS-DOGS fnuffle
Fig. 4. Excerpt from Peering Database
Fig. 5. Distribution and monitoring structure.
incorporate network routing metric optimizations a` la Fortz
et alia [25].
C. Monitoring
When device configurations are fully generated, the canoni-
cal version of the configuration is on the management system,
not the device (Figure 5). This means that the device config-
uration should not change unexpectedly. To verify this, there
are tools, e.g., rancid, (http://shrubbery.net/rancid/) which
are used to pull the running configuration from the device
on a periodic basis (traditionally once an hour), archive it,
and diff it from the previous and/or canonical configuration.
Any significant deviations usually cause email to be sent to
engineers. The usual cause of such deviations is an over-eager
technician; however, this monitoring system can also catch
changes made directly to devices by outsiders.
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The simple use of rancid to gather and diff running con-
figurations from all devices is not necessarily tied to a network
database or configuration generation system. Therefore, while
thorough network configuration is done by very few ISPs,
rancid or its equivalent is used by most ISPs above trivial
size.
A change made by an outsider is, of course, a form of
intrusion. This means that standard intrusion detection and
tracing techniques can be applied. The IP address of the
machine from which unauthorized changes were made can
be traced. (This assumes, of course, that the network element
or the console server connected to it do sufficient logging,
itself an important security requirement.) Furthermore, the
differences between the authorized configuration and the one
installed by the intruder can give valuable clues as to goals
and motives.
Database-driven configuration can also reduce operational
alerts: the database can serve as input to a root cause analysis
system. Root cause analysis is a difficult enough problem to
start with; trying to do it without accurate knowledge of the
precise running configuration is likely impossible. Using a
single database both to generate element configurations and as
input to the analysis system is much more likely to succeed.
One interesting side effect of a system rigorously driven
from a data base is that security and other audits and valida-
tions can be done against the database, as opposed to scraping
and digesting raw device configurations. If nothing else, this
means that the analyzer knows the precise meaning of each
datum; there is no need for the analysis engine to guess where
some value came from. Suppose, for example, that an actual
router configuration’s source address filter ACL ( [11], [26])
lists an address block different from the one assigned to that
customer, per the routing ACL. Is that due to a typographical
error, or is it because the customer has more than one address
block, but can only advertise one of them to the router? In
a database-driven configuration system, the answer would be
unambiguous.
As the software toolbase has clear definitions and details
of all devices, interfaces, interface configurations, etc., it can
also generate and help maintain changes in the database used
to control the real-time monitoring stsrems used by a netork
operations center (NOC). Custom monitoring systems can
directly access the data in the network database, or the needed
data for externally developed (free or public, open or closed
source) software systems can be generated by glue-ware from
the internal network database.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that configuration, and hence configuration man-
agement, are crucial to security. We assert that it is equally
clear that even in moderate-size environments, it should not
be done by hand. Too much can go wrong.
Three elements are necessary for successful management of
security configuration: clear policies; accurate knowledge of
all computers and network elements; and proper management
software. To be sure, all of these are needed for other types
of configuration management. However, in a security setting,
a failure can have consequences far beyond the failure of one
device or system.
In other words, for organizational security, configuration
management is vital. However, we do not know how to do this.
The challenges, and hence the need for research, are several-
fold.
First, we must understand what configurations should be
like, and how they should be set. This is not just a question
of file contents and the like; the human element — how
people understand and specify configurations — is at least
as important.
Second, we need to be able to abstract and parameterize
configurations. That is, we need to be able to create meta-
configurations, and merge these with the knowledge of the
machines that actually exist.
The difficulty of doing these raises a third issue: can we
create configuration mechanisms that are more amenable to
such specification? Today’s systems were designed for hand
configuration, with few nods to automation. Can we do better?
Fourth, we need effective ways to understand exactly what
our networks really consist of. Note that this needs to be
done in ways that protect privacy, not so much for business
reasons as because often, consumer-grade machines are used
for business purposes. It may be acceptable for corporate
machines to respond to “who’s out there, and what are your
capabilities” messages; it certainly is not acceptable in a
consumer environment.
Finally, we need to build robust, secure systems that imple-
ment all of the above. As the cost of developing such systems
is far more than a medium or small network provider can
afford, and seems to be beyond the means of the majority of
large providers, it would be a public good if one or more such
systems were available as open source.
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